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Global Inequalities 
Transnational Processes and Transregional Entanglements
Manuela Boatcă
Abstract
Current sociological understandings tend to presuppose that the transformation of 
inequality patterns entails a series of “new” phenomena, which make the coining of 
new concepts such as the “Europeanization” and the “transnationalization” of social 
inequality necessary. In turn, the paper argues that, at least since the European 
expansion into the Americas, inequalities have been the result of transnational 
processes arising from transregional entanglements between shifting metropolitan 
and peripheral areas. To this end, the paper uses the example of the Caribbean as 
“Europe’s first colonial backyard” (S. Mintz) in order to show the historical continuities 
between “creolization” as a term originally coined to describe processes specific to the 
Caribbean and what is being analyzed today under the label of the “transnationalization” 
of  (Western) Europe. In showing how the transregional flows of people, goods, and 
capital established transnational links between inequality patterns between Europe and 
its colonies in the Caribbean as early as the sixteenth century, the paper subsequently 
claims that theorizing the continuum of structures of power linking colonialism to (post)
coloniality is an essential element in of the endeavor of creolizing Europe.
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1. The Transnationalization of Europe?
A casual traveler to the Caribbean region would notice […] the variegated 
appearance of the people, and the rainbow spectrum of ‘nonwhiteness’ among 
them. European and American cities have now taken on some of that once 
startling variety and color. But in the Caribbean, it is the way people have looked 
for a very long time (Mintz 2010: 24).
For mainstream sociology, transnationalization represents a major way in which the 
larger process of globalization affects Europe. First formulated within migration research, 
the transnational paradigm was conceived as an explicit attempt at overcoming the 
methodological nationalism that characterized both migration scholarship and social 
theory more generally, and that conflated the nation-state with society, making the former 
the unit of analysis of processes of social mobility, social change, or labor migration 
(Glick Schiller/Wimmer 2002). Applying the critique of methodological nationalism to 
the growing field of European studies – particularly in, but not confined to, sociology 
– thus has tended to translate as viewing transnational flows of people, goods, and 
capital as a relatively new trend in the European context (Berger/Weiß 2008, Pries 
2008). The result is described as “Europeanization” – of political institutions, social 
structures, or cultural patterns – and as the realization of old cosmopolitan aspirations 
towards overcoming nationalism, acknowledging difference, and achieving world 
citizenship (Delanty/Rumford 2005: 193). 
In turn, the present paper argues that inequalities have been the result of transnational 
processes for more than five centuries. At least since the European expansion into 
the Americas, transnational migration, the Atlantic slave trade, and the unequal 
economic exchange between shifting metropolitan and peripheral areas have provided 
transregional entanglements that decisively shaped the inequality structures of both 
the former colonizing as well as the former colonized regions. In order to show the 
historical continuities between “creolization” as a term originally coined to describe 
processes specific to the Caribbean and what is being analyzed today under the label 
of the “transnationalization” of (Western) Europe, the example of the Caribbean as 
“Europe’s first colonial backyard” (Mintz 1998) is used in the following as a paradigmatic 
case. In showing how the transregional flows of people, goods, and capital established 
transnational links among inequality patterns between Europe and its colonies in 
the Caribbean as early as the sixteenth century, the paper subsequently claims that 
theorizing the continuum of structures of power linking colonialism to (post)coloniality 
is an essential element in the endeavor of creolizing theory.
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2. The Caribbean as a Transnational Space
As both scholars of and from the Caribbean have repeatedly pointed out, trans-
border connections, culture flows, and the transnational movement of people and 
capital have characterized the region from the moment of its conquest and up to the 
present day. As the first region to be colonized by Europe in the sixteenth century 
and the last one to be decolonized in the twentieth, the Caribbean was shaped by 
the worldwide demand and supply of colonial labor throughout the entire history of 
the capitalist world-economy: despite its modest geographic size, it received between 
one-third and a half of all the enslaved Africans shipped to the New World between 
1492 and the end of the 18th century (see fig.1), significant numbers of indentured and 
contracted Europeans during much of the same period, as well as indentured Asians 
after the formal abolition of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century (Cervantes-
Rodríguez/Grosfoguel/Mielants 2009, Mintz 2010, Rediker 2007). In turn, the first half 
of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a circuit of intra-regional migration 
of cheap labor force to the larger Caribbean islands where U.S.-led corporations 
operated; after World War II, when cheap labor from the non-independent territories of 
the Caribbean was explicitly and massively recruited to work in Western Europe and 
the United States, the entire region turned into a source of transcontinental emigration 
(Grosfoguel et al. 2009). The Carribbean has therefore been repeatedly theorized in 
terms of transculturation, creolization, and hybridity, while concepts such as remittance 
societies, circular migration, or diaspora, now widely used within the growing field of 
transnational studies, have first been coined in relation with the Caribbean region (Mintz 
1998, Glick Schiller 2009). As long as methodological nationalism reigned supreme in 
both area studies and the social sciences more generally, however, such trans-border 
phenomena were conceived as anomalies and the Caribbean itself was treated as a 
deviant case, the reality of which was irrelevant for anthropological theory-building (Glick 
Schiller 2009: 22). For sociology and political economy, whose emphasis until very 
recently lay on modern industrial societies, the Caribbean served for a long time as a 
paradigmatic example of the contrast between slavery and free labor and the respective 
connotations of backwardness, inefficiency, underdevelopment, and non-White labor 
characterizing New World slavery as a particular form of agricultural organization. As 
such, they constituted the opposite of the freedom, the modern character, and the high 
productivity of the White European wage-workers – which supposedly lay at the root of 
the development of industrial capitalist “economies”. 
Instead, as a continent of mass emigration, which, alongside nation-building processes, 
expulsions, and waves of ethnic cleansing, had produced exceptionally high levels 
of ethnic homogenization, Europe appeared to be, until mid-twentieth century, the 
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opposite of the racially and ethnically diverse Caribbean. Especially, but not only 
during the nineteenth century, all Western European states but France were countries 
of transcontinental emigration, mainly to the Americas, while intracontinental migration 
was negligible. In 1950, the non-White population in the UK was estimated at 0.4%, 
while the “foreign” population amounted to less than 5% throughout Western Europe 
except Switzerland1. It was only with the postwar recruitment of migrant labor and the 
aftermath of the administrative decolonization in the early 1960s that Europe as a 
continent became “more of an arrival hall than a departure lounge for intercontinental 
migration” (Therborn 1995: 41). All Western European states2 became recipients of 
large migrant populations from the recently decolonized Africa and the dictatorships-
ridden South America, several waves of unskilled labor migrants contracted by 
government policies of postwar economic reconstruction from adjacent or formerly 
colonized countries, and, after 1990, hundreds of thousands of Eastern European 
war refugees. If creolization – a geographically and historically specific process 
related to the mass movement of people and goods from Europe and Africa to the 
Americas – has acquired currency in the context of transnationalism and globalization 
studies, this is, according to Sidney Mintz, because “the world has now become a 
macrocosm of what the Caribbean region was in the 16th century” (Mintz 1998: 120). 
Far from being an instance of historical particularism concerning one specific world 
region and one unique socioeconomic context, the Caribbean merely encompassed 
many transnational processes and transregional entanglements at a “theoretically 
inconvenient time” (Mintz 1998: 124).
 
1 Therborn (1995: 49) rightly points out that the OECD data quoted here was not collected having the 
foreign-born population in mind (which would alter the estimate of ethnic heterogeneity in Europe), 
nor did the category “ethnic minorities“ for the UK explicitly differentiate between White and non-
White populations. A conceptualization based solely on citizenship of course fails to account, among 
other things, for the presence of (non-White) colonial subjects possessing metropolitan citizenship 
on European soil. However, as detailed in the following, their numbers can reasonably be assumed 
to have been very low before the 1960s.
2 Except Ireland. France experienced a first wave of immigration in the 1830s, followed by an influx of 
colonial immigrants from North Africa, especially Algeria; Switzerland actively recruited foreign labour 
in the late nineteenth century, as did Belgium after World War I (Therborn 1995: 41, 51).
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Figure 1: Volume and Direction of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade from all African 
to all American Regions
Source: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, www.slavevoyages.org.
3. Relational Inequalities and Global Processes
Today, the Caribbean is, together with Latin America, the region with the highest 
inequality worldwide (UNDP 2011). For both policy-makers and mainstream inequality 
theory, the underlying causes are to be sought at the level of national policies or 
regional economic patterns, such that Latin America and the Caribbean’s persistent 
inequality is usually traced back to a lag in the implementation of efficient industrial 
production, economic liberalism, free labor, and democratic structures that are seen 
to promote economic redistribution. Thus, high inequality in poor countries that relied 
for a long time on agriculture and mining under coerced forms of labor (i.e., slavery, 
but also serfdom or debt peonage) and allowed access to political rights to only a 
small minority of the population is viewed either as a consequence of traditional 
structures or as the legacy of colonialism. The inequality patterns of today‘s wealthy 
European countries, featuring universal franchise, mass education, and a welfare 
state on the one hand, and of poor (Latin American) countries, characterized by limited 
access to public education, a long history of restricted franchise, and land policies 
favoring White elites on the other hand are therefore presented as having emerged 
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independently of each other (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 42). At best, the differential 
impact of colonialism on Latin America and the Caribbean is interpreted as a “reversal 
of fortune” (Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson 2002) – of previously poor regions becoming 
rich after the Europeans introduced “good institutions” encouraging investment, and 
of previously rich regions becoming poor and more unequal as a result of slavery and 
economic exploitation by the colonizers. 
Arguing against the similarly state-centered modernization paradigm in the early 
1970’s, dependency theorist André Gunder Frank (1972) had instead characterized 
the gradual impoverishment of previously rich colonies in the Americas as “the 
development of underdevelopment” in a global capitalist system: The richer a region 
had been at the time of its colonization in terms of exploitable resources, the more 
underdeveloped it was in Frank’s time – as, for instance, Brazil; conversely, the poorer 
a colony had been upon its foundation, the more developed the area was in the present 
– e.g. New England (Frank 1972: 19). According to Frank, this dialectic of capitalist 
development had been contingent upon the emergence of an export economy in the 
richer colonies and of local manufacturing in the poorer ones, thus occasioning widely 
different class structures in the respective regions. More recently, Charles Bergquist 
(1996) had examined this very phenomenon under the heading of “the paradox of 
American development“, which, for him, hinged explicitly on the systems of labor control 
employed in each area: While the resource-richest American colonies initially thrived 
on the exports of primary commodities produced under slave or indentured labor, as 
did Upper Peru and Bolivia on silver mining until the end of the seventeenth century, 
Saint Domingue on sugar and South Carolina on rice until the end of the eighteenth, all 
are currently among the poorest and/or least industrialized; at the same time, Britain‘s 
New England colonies, which started out as the poorest in the Americas, had by the 
end of the colonial period become the richest and had set the standards against which 
the industrialization processes of other regions had subsequently been measured 
(Bergquist 1996: 15). While the explanation for these divergent developments had 
previously been sought in the character of British (or French) colonial institutions as 
against Spanish and Portuguese ones and the different cultural legacies they imprinted 
on their respective colonies, for both Frank and Bergquist, such a simplified cultural 
argument does not hold. In particular, as Bergquist points out, the influence of British 
culture and institutions, as well as the ethnic composition of the colonizers had been 
the same in the case of both southern and northern British colonies in the New World; 
therefore, the reasons for the widely differing developments rather lie in the natural 
resources, labor supplies, as well as the labor systems developed according to these 
conditions in each particular location. The organization of labor around wage-work and 
production for the domestic market in the New England and the mid-Atlantic British 
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colonies, as opposed to the slave-based economies of the US South and the British 
Caribbean, geared toward export of raw materials to Europe, had consequently been a 
matter of strategic location in the existing trade system as well as of natural and human 
resources (Bergquist 1996: 24).
The clearest proof of this argument lies in the economic and political evolution 
of the colonies of the southern mainland – or what would later become the South 
of the United States. During the colonial period, the “slave South“ provided luxury 
commodities such as sugar, tobacco, and coffee to Europe. After independence, i.e., 
once industrial capitalism under British hegemony made commercial credit available 
for primary commodities such as cotton and the Atlantic slave trade was abolished, 
the South organized ever tighter around slave labor, encouraged local slave-breeding 
and the internal slave trade (McMichael 1991, Tomich 2004). Already in the eighteenth 
century, the industrialized North, much like Europe, had become a quasi-metropolis 
to the slaveholding South, a role that would be reinforced after the South‘s defeat 
in the Civil War and the imposition of the North‘s political institutions and legislation 
on the South. Among these political characteristics, the North‘s relatively egalitarian 
distribution of land and the extension of suffrage to male proprietors that went with 
it, were, however, primarily derived from the family and wage-labor system on which 
the North had specialized, not from a higher regard for democratic values than in the 
South. In contrast to this internal division of labor between the U.S. North and its South, 
Bergquist pointed out that the different trajectory of the former British and Spanish 
American colonies in the post-independence era could best be grasped by remarking 
that, unlike the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean had “no North“, i.e., 
no region where a free labor system dating back to the colonial era had produced a 
relatively egalitarian, rapidly industrializing society as a basis for liberal political ideas” 
(Bergquist 1996: 36). 
Although in both North and South America, independence from British and Iberian 
colonial rule had failed to give rise to (relatively) homogeneous nation-states, producing 
instead what Aníbal Quijano has called “independent states of colonial societies“ 
(2000a: 565), their racial and ethnic inequality patterns were markedly different. In 
the United States and in most countries of the Southern Cone (except Brazil), Indian 
servants and Black slaves represented demographic minorities, while wage laborers 
and independent producers accounted for the bulk of the local economic production 
after decolonization; in turn, in most other Ibero-American societies, serfdom was the 
social condition of the majority of the Indios, who made up the largest segment of the 
population in Mexico, Central America, and the Andes, whereas Blacks predominated 
in Brazil and the Caribbean (Quijano 2006: 201, 203). The White bourgeoisie in Latin 
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America, whose profits derived from slave-holding and serfdom, consequently had 
no interest in organizing local production around wage labor (for which European and 
Asian workers were imported after the abolition of slavery), or in the democratization 
of the political process. Unlike in the European case, the homogenization of Latin 
American societies had thus entailed the extermination of Indians and the political 
exclusion of Blacks and mestizos, and as such could not have led to nationalization or 
democracy: 
In no Latin American country today is it possible to find a fully nationalized 
society, or even a genuine nation-state. The national homogenization of the 
population could only have been achieved through a radical and global process 
of the democratization of society and the state. That democratization would 
have implied ... the process of decolonizing social, political, and cultural relations 
that maintain and reproduce racial social classification. The structure of power 
was and even continues to be organized on and around the colonial axis. 
Consequently, from the point of view of the dominant groups, the construction 
of the nation, and above all the central state, has been conceptualized and 
deployed against American Indians, blacks, and mestizos (Quijano 2000a: 
567f.).
The notion that the process of decolonization undergone by Latin American societies had 
occurred only at a juridical and administrative level – leaving intact colonial structures 
of social and cultural domination as well as the economic and institutional bases on 
which colonial control depended – lies at the center of Quijano‘s concept of “coloniality 
of power“ (2000b, 2007). As a set of political, economic, and socio-cultural hierarchies 
between colonizers and colonized dating back to the sixteenth century, coloniality is 
thus distinct from premodern forms of colonial rule in that it translates administrative 
hierarchies into a racial/ethnic division of labor; and it is more encompassing than 
modern European colonialism alone, in that it transfers both the racial/ethnic hierarchies 
– i.e., the “colonial difference“ – and the international division of labor produced during 
the time of direct or indirect colonial rule into post-independence times (Mignolo 2000: 
54ff.; Quijano 2000b: 381, note 1). What, in an Occidentalist perspective, is framed 
today as a “new“ indigenous question of countries in the region hence merely represents 
the carry-over into the 21st century of this unresolved “disencounter between nation, 
identity, and democracy“, i.e., the coloniality of power:
Why were the ‘indios’ a problem in the debate on the implementation of the 
modern nation-state in these new republics? ... the ‘indios’ were not simply 
serfs, as the ‘Blacks’ were slaves. They were, first of all, ‘inferior races’... This, 
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exactly, was the indigenous question: it was not sufficient to remove the weight 
of non-wage forms of labor such as serfdom from the ‘indios’ in order to make 
them equal to the others, as had been possible in Europe during the liberal 
revolutions ... Who would then be working for the masters? (Quijano 2006: 196, 
my translation).
Moreover, among the region‘s promoters of economic liberalism on the model of 
Europe, it had been the owners of large estates who had made up the most powerful 
classes far into the post-independence period. Their high stakes in Latin America‘s 
expanding role as a supplier of agricultural exports to industrialized countries and their 
vested interest in the maintenance of labor systems favoring the unequal distribution 
of wealth had therefore stalled both the spread of free labor and industrialization in the 
region for a considerable period of time. The highly polarized, undemocratic system 
based on the exploitation of unfree labor thus created was therefore a response to 
this particular set of geographic and socioeconomic factors, rather than of any cultural 
or institutional legacy. Or, in Bergquist’s cogent formulation: “These societies failed 
to develop in the post-independence era in the way their once-poor, predominantly 
White, northern neighbors did not because they had too many blacks, but because 
they had too many slaves“ (1996: 33). To this day, the gap between rich and poor is 
smaller in those Caribbean countries where no large indigenous population survived the 
European invasion and no slave plantation economy was set up, such as Costa Rica. 
The same holds true for other parts of Latin America in which both middle and lower 
classes were primarily of European origin, with lower inequality levels in Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and southern Brazil (Hein/Huhn 2009). 
The conclusion Bergquist reached pursuing this historical line of argument in turn 
constitutes the point of departure of a world-historical analysis of how the economic 
legacy of colonialism relates to the differences between today‘s inequality patterns. 
On the basis of the Gini coefficients of ninety-six countries, Korzeniewicz and Moran 
(2009) argue that national inequality patterns can be grouped into two distinct and 
relatively stable clusters, characterized by high or low levels of inequality, respectively. 
Not surprisingly, the high inequality cluster (above a Gini coefficient of 0.502) contains 
the prominent examples of inequality research, South Africa and Brazil, but also the 
bulk of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, whereas Australia, Japan, Canada, 
the whole of Western Europe and parts of Eastern Europe fall into the low inequality 
cluster (below 0.329; see fig. 2). 
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Figure 2: Trends in High and Low Inequality 1960-2005, Selected Countries
Source: Korzeniewicz/Moran (2009: 20).
While the high-inequality pattern has been characterized by systematic exclusion 
on the basis of ascriptive criteria such as race, ethnicity, and gender in order to limit 
access to economic, social and political opportunity, the low-inequality pattern has 
involved widespread relative inclusion through the extension of property and political 
rights increasingly derived from achieved (rather than ascribed) characteristics, such 
as one‘s education level, and the development of welfare states – which, in turn, further 
buttressed patterns of democratic inclusion. Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) find that 
membership in both clusters can be traced back in time to the eighteenth century, 
which prompts them to coin the term “inequality equilibria“ for both cases. While there 
has been movement in and out of each cluster at several points in time, and countries 
such as Argentina, Venezuela, or Uruguay, but also the USA since about the year 2000 
occupy an in-between position today, the most striking result is that virtually no country 
has been able to shift from the high to the low inequality cluster. 
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At the same time, the origins of the institutional arrangements typical of the low 
inequality equilibrium (LIE) are less apparent than those characterizing the high 
inequality equilibrium (HIE), which clearly go back to colonial slavery (Korzeniewicz/
Moran 2009: 31). 
Against the state-centered view of most inequality studies as well as the modernization 
paradigm, both of which focused on national policies for reducing inequality, 
Korzeniewicz/Moran (2009) consequently advance a world-historical perspective, i.e., 
one considering the world-system in the long-term. This particular shift in the unit of 
analysis and in the temporal scope of prevailing inequality structures reveals that high-
inequality equilibria historically constituted innovations in the world-economy, while 
low-inequality equilibria represented relative comparative advantages over these as 
well as over earlier arrangements. Far from the archaic and backward forms of labor 
and market organization for which they are usually held, the various forms of coerced 
labor in general and slavery in particular had instead been highly profitable ones. Their 
implementation in Latin America and the Caribbean, i.e., the areas with the highest 
income inequality today, had rapidly turned the region into the world epicenter for the 
creation and accumulation of wealth from the period following European colonization 
until well into the eighteenth century (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 44). During the same 
time, Europe and the North American colonies – today‘s low inequality havens – 
although relying on manufactures and a free-labor system, were marginal, unprofitable 
and largely dependent on imports for meeting their economic needs. 
Instead of assuming a simple correlation between equity and economic growth, as 
postulated by modernization theory, Korzeniewicz/Moran (2007) therefore suggest 
that the relationship between the two has changed over time. From high inequality 
generating more wealth under innovative extractive institutions such as plantation 
slavery in the New World, the relationship shifted to low inequality contexts gaining a 
comparative advantage over the former by means of different institutional or political 
practices such as tax or wage-setting policies, extended access to education, or the 
regulation of international migration. Such a proposition however runs counter to more 
than just a modernizationist approach to economic development, as it undermines basic 
tenets of the sociological canon - above all, the sequence of tradition and modernity:
Rather than simple industrialization, or a universal transition from tradition to 
modernity, successful economic growth historically has involved meeting a 
moving target of innovative practices (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2007: 18).
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What Frank had viewed as the characteristically capitalist dialectic of development 
and underdevelopment and Bergquist had treated as the paradox of American 
development tout court, Korzeniewicz and Moran thus analyze using Schumpeter‘s 
notion of creative destruction of innovation practices, which they interpret as a “constant 
drive toward inequality“: True to Schumpeter‘s definition of capitalism as essentially 
a form of change involving the recurrent transformation of the economic and social 
structure against prevailing arrangements, they analyze the emergence of extractive 
institutions of high-inequality contexts such as plantation slavery and coerced cash-
crop labor as significant innovations that provided competitive advantages to colonial 
and settler elites and allowed for an extraordinary accumulation of wealth and power 
in the area (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 55). In such contexts, it was social hierarchies 
based on ascribed characteristics – chiefly, race – which allowed for the high degree 
of polarization of the emerging labor structure along the lines of White supremacy vs. 
non-White subordination. Conversely, areas such as the New England colonies, in 
which the native labor force was scarce, but the amount of land available for cultivation 
abundant, encouraged the spread of private property across the adult male population. 
The latter areas thus maintained a pattern of relatively low inequality, which, in its 
turn, gained a comparative advantage over the high-inequality pattern after the onset 
of large-scale industrialization. Although the low levels of inequality in such regions 
gradually came to be perceived as structured around achieved characteristics such 
as one‘s level of education or professional position, their long-term stability had 
nevertheless been safeguarded by restricting physical access to these regions on the 
basis of ascribed categories, especially national identity and citizenship, through the 
control of immigration flows. 
What appears as a pattern of relative inclusion of the population through redistributive 
state policies, democratic participation, and widespread access to education in low 
inequality contexts when taking the nation-state as a unit of analysis is thus revealed 
to entail the selective exclusion from the same rights of large sectors of the population 
located outside national borders, once the analytical frame shifts to the world-economy 
(Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 78). The maintenance of national low inequality patterns of 
relative inclusion consequently requires the enforcement of selective exclusion on the 
state border, and thus the (re-)production of high inequality patterns between nations. 
According to Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009), this has especially been the case for the 
borders of nation-states since the nineteenth century, making the nation-state itself the 
main criterion for social stratification on a global scale ever since. Thus, late nineteenth-
century mass migration across national borders led to significant convergence of wage 
rates between core and semiperipheral countries – mainly Europe and the so-called 
settler colonies of North America, Australia and New Zealand – but also tended to raise 
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the competition for resources and employment opportunities within receiving countries, 
often located in the New World. The result was an increase in inequality in some national 
contexts, in which the large inflow of unskilled labor caused rising wage differentials 
relative to skilled labor, and a decrease of inequality in others – i.e., in the sending 
countries, where the income differential between skilled and unskilled workers declined 
and overall wages rose3. In the case of Europe, migration to the New World provided 
a poverty outlet to some 50 million Europeans or 12% of the continent‘s population 
between 1850 and 1930 (Therborn 1995: 40). While almost all European states during 
this period were primarily sending countries, some experienced out-migration flows 
as high as 50% of the national population (in the case of the British Isles) or one-third 
of it (in the case of Italy), to the point of causing debates as to the rights of states to 
restrict emigration. Large-scale emigration and the high level of ethnic homogeneity 
attained by the 1950s had ensured that processes of collective identification as well 
as collective organization within Europe occurred in terms of class interests and class 
conflict rather than ethnic or racial allegiance. Labor unrest, the rise of scientific racism 
by the end of World War I, and social and economic protectionist measures in the 
wake of the Great Depression gradually made restrictions on immigration across 
countries of the core necessary, while strengthening notions of citizenship as a basis 
for entitlement to social and political rights (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 84). With the 
decisive reversal of the European migration trend in the 1960s, the ethnic and racial 
conflicts that accompanied the rise in immigration came to the fore as a largely extra-
European problem that increasingly posed a threat to Western Europe in the form of 
ex-colonial subjects, guest workers (turned permanent), and incessant flows of labor 
migrants and refugees. As such, they appeared to be – and were often discussed as 
– forms of (ethnic and/or racial) stratification foreign to the class structure otherwise 
characterizing Western Europe. For the United States, Korzeniewicz and Moran (2008: 
10) show a parallel first trend toward declining income inequality as restrictions on 
immigration increased in the beginning of the 20th century. In turn, the 1965 reform 
of the US immigra tion policy, itself tailored to the active recruitment of labor migrants 
from Latin America and the Caribbean in response to the rising demand for unskilled 
labor throughout the world-economy, resulted in a sharp rise in income inequality (see 
fig. 3). As in the case of Europe, the increase in inequality seemed to be a foreign-
induced phenomenon directly linked to the inflow of (mostly uneducated) immigrants, 
thus prompting anti-immigrant sentiment and policies in response.
3 Since the constitution of formal labor markets tended to exclude the participation of women, the over-
whel ming majority of the population accounting for the mass labor migration of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century was male (Korzeniewicz/Moran/Stach 2003: 24).
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Figure 3: Inequality and Immigration: The United States over the 20th Century
Source: Korzeniewicz/Moran (2008: 24) after WIID (2005) and Camarota (2007).
Against this background, the ascribed characteristics of nationhood and citizenship 
are considered to be as important for global stratification as class, usually considered 
to depend on levels of achievement. Yet, while class membership has regulated the 
differential access to resources at the level of national populations, citizenship – i.e., 
nation-state membership – has restricted or undercut both the mobility and the access 
to resources of the poorest segments of the world population for much of the twentieth 
century. Shifting the unit of analysis to the world-system thus reveals that ascriptive 
criteria remain the fundamental basis of stratification and inequality and that national 
identity has been the most salient among them (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 88).
The issue of citizenship, which became part and parcel of the Occidentalist discourse of 
the civilizing mission in the wake of the French Revolution, is thereby revealed to have 
been relevant not only for the relative social and political inclusion of the populations 
of Western European nation-states, but just as much for the selective exclusion of 
the colonized and/or non-European populations from the same social and political 
rights throughout recent history. Thus, if the gradual extension of citizenship rights 
from propertied White males to all White males and to White women accounted for 
the development of the low inequality equilibrium within France as of the eighteenth 
century, the categorical exclusion of St. Domingue‘s Black and Mulatto population from 
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French citizenship, irrespective of their property status, ensured the maintenance of 
a high inequality equilibrium between France and St. Domingue/Haiti. As has been 
documented for the postcolonial migration flows between several Western European 
countries and their former colonies, as well as for the U.S. and its “protectorates”, the 
possession of the citizenship of the former metropole remains to this day a crucial factor 
deciding the timing and the destination of ex-colonial subjects‘ emigration as well as 
the strive for independence in the remaining colonial possessions: Fear of losing Dutch 
citizenship and the privileges it incurs has led to a dramatic increase in Surinamese 
emigration to the Netherlands in the years preceding Surinam‘s independence from 
the “motherland” (1974/75) and remains the main reason behind the lack of political 
pressure for independence in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba today (Amersfoort/Niekerk 
2003). Analogously, the extension of United States citizenship rights to the populations 
of all Caribbean colonies after World War II triggered a massive transfer of labor 
migrants from the Caribbean to the U.S. Migrants from non-independent territories 
such as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands could thus enjoy both the welfare and 
the social rights that went with U.S. citizenship, which constituted a strong incentive 
for migration across the lower social strata in their home countries. In turn, only 
the more educated, middle sectors of the working class from formally independent 
Caribbean states like Jamaica, Barbados, and St. Vincent, who therefore did not 
possess metropolitan citizenship, chose to migrate to the U.S. (Cervantes-Rodríguez/
Grosfoguel/Mielants 2009). 
Comparing the advantages that different citizenship regimes such as the U.S.-American 
and various Western European states offered citizenship holders at distinct moments 
in time is not to gloss over the differences between jus soli and jus sanguinis principles 
of allocating political membership in a state. Rather, the analogies serve to show 
the extent to which the ascribed characteristic of citizenship as a principle of global 
stratification straddles national political traditions while functioning in all as a kind of 
inherited property usually associated with the stratification order of feudal societies, 
not liberal democratic ones:
By legally identifying birth, either in a certain territory, or to certain parents, as 
the decisive factor in the distribution of the precious property of membership, 
current citizenship principles render memberships in well-off polities beyond 
the reach of the vast majority of the world’s population. It is in this way that 
citizenship may be thought of as the quintessential inherited entitlement of our 
time (Schachar 2009: 11).
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4. Global Stratification by Citizenship
If national identity, institutionalized as birthright citizenship, has been the main 
mechanism ensuring the maintenance of the high inequality equilibrium between 
the core and the periphery, then migration to wealthy regions becomes the “single 
most immediate and effective means of global social mobility for populations in most 
countries of the world“ (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 107). Thus, international migration, 
which entails gaining access to at least the average income of the poorer country 
deciles of a much richer nation-state, not only represents a strategy of upward mobility 
for populations of ex-colonial countries possessing metropolitan citizenship, but also a 
means of eluding the ascribed position derived from the national citizenship of a poor 
state for populations able and willing to risk illegal, undocumented or non-citizen status 
in a rich state. Using the inequality data for six countries interlinked through considerable 
migration flows, Korzeniewicz and Moran show how anyone in the poorest seven to 
eight deciles of Bolivia or Guatemala can move up several global income deciles4 
by migrating to Argentina or Mexico, respectively, and gaining access to the average 
income of the second-poorest decile there. Even more strikingly, anyone but people 
in the wealthiest decile in both Argentina and Mexico is able to “jump“ several global 
income deciles by entering Spain or the United States‘ second-poorest decile through 
migration (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 108f.). In all these cases, the upward mobility 
of trasnational migrants is considerably higher than either an individual’s educational 
attainment at home or the economic growth of one‘s country of origin would have 
allowed during a lifetime (judging by the most successful examples, such as South 
Korea in the 1980s or China today). However, Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) claim, 
the systematic naturalization of categorical inequality through which the idea of 
national citizenship was constructed upholds nationally bounded measures, such as 
educational attainment and economic growth, as appropriate strategies for upward 
mobility, thus further reproducing the patterns that had structured global inequality 
according to religious, ethnic or racial criteria in previous centuries5. 
4 Using a sample of 85 states, Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) combine country income deciles (as 
an indicator of within-country inequality) with estimates of per capita gross national income (as 
an indicator of between-country inequality), eventually ranking the distribution of income for 850 
country deciles into 10 global income deciles. The rearrangement reveals that the two wealthiest 
global income deciles – those with an average per capita income of $7,898 or higher – encompass 
the entire population of Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia. By 
contrast, between 70% and 80% of the population of Gambia, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are 
located within the bottom global decile, having an average of $266 or lower (2009: 92).
5 “Categorical inequality and ascription are perhaps more fundamental than ever to the workings of 
global inequality: nevertheless (but this is not coincidental), such inequality coexists with a system of 
beliefs that asserts the primacy of individual achievement and opportunity, as pursued within nations, 
as the engine of everything“ (Korzeniewicz/Moran 2009: 100).
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The construction of citizenship since the nineteenth century therefore constitutes an 
instance of the coloniality of power through which the racial/ethnic hierarchies established 
as early as the sixteenth century are being recreated in novel forms in postcolonial 
contexts. While the world political and economic elite, i.e., a tiny percentage of the 
world population, enjoys “global citizenship” and unlimited access across borders, the 
citizenship rights of the majority of the world population more closely resemble the 
status accruing from Black citizenship in the US South before the civil rights movement 
– i.e., rights severely curtailed by institutional as well as non-institutional frontiers and 
restrictions to mobility – than rights deriving from global, flexible citizenship (Mignolo 
2006). Both the various types of frontiers and citizen mobility are thus closely related 
to the world-economic structures that the colonial and imperial differences contributed 
to creating and maintaining:
What is important [...] is the directionality of migrations for which the very idea 
of citizenship is today at stake. It is obvious that there are more Nigerians, 
Bolivians, Indians, Ukrainians, or Caribbeans who want to migrate to Europe or 
the US than people in the US desiring to migrate to any of those places. We do 
not know of any stories of Anglo Americans dying in the Arizona desert when 
marching to cross the Mexican border. [...] there are more Bolivians crossing 
the border and migrating to Argentina and Chile than there are Chileans 
migrating in mass to Bolivia. [...] You are not stopped at the gates (of frontiers or 
embassies) because you are poor, but because of your religion, your language, 
your nationality, your skin: whatever is taken as indicator of the colonial and 
imperial differences (Mignolo 2006: 316f.).
The logic behind the processes by which racial hierarchies are re-created in postcolonial 
contexts becomes especially clear in the case of the racialization of those Caribbean 
migrants, who, despite enjoying legal status as metropolitan citizens in France, the 
United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, experience “second-class 
citizenship“ (Cervantes-Rodríguez/Grosfoguel/Mielants 2009: 7) upon arrival in the 
metropole, where they become the main targets of racial discrimination, social exclusion 
and criminalization on the part of the dominant (White) population. Grosfoguel (2003) 
therefore identifies three different types of migrant populations according to the colonial 
and/or imperial history that links the sending and the receiving countries, and thereby 
distinguishes between: immigrants, incorporated or perceived as part of the “White 
majority” by the host population and able to experience upward social mobility in the 
first or second generation; colonial immigrants, whose countries of origin have not 
been colonized by the country to which they migrated, but who nevertheless are racially 
stereotyped by analogy with the receiving country‘s colonial subjects, like Dominicans 
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and Haitians in the United States, Moroccans in the Netherlands, or Kurds in France; 
and, finally, colonial/racial subjects of empire, who have a long, direct colonial history 
with the host country, where racist discourses as well as the prevalent racial/ethnic 
hierarchy are frequently constructed in opposition to these (post)colonial populations. 
This is the case of Puerto Ricans, African Americans and Chicanos/as in the United 
States, Dutch Antilleans and Surinamese in the Netherlands, Algerians, Antilleans and 
Senegalese in France, Congolese in Belgium or West Indians and South Asians in 
the United Kingdom. The typology could easily be expanded to include what could 
be called racial/ethnic labor migrants in Western Europe, with no colonial ties to the 
receiving country and initially recruited as part of the larger imports of foreign labor, 
but racialized on account of lesser or lacking Europeanness, such as be Turks and 
Poles (but not Greeks or Italians) in Germany. Thus, the non-Western, often non-
European and non-White origin of both colonial immigrants and colonial/racial subjects 
of empire plays a central part in the naturalization of categorical inequality as well as 
in the regulation of social mobility available through transnational migration. With the 
growing trend towards ex-colonial immigration into Europe and the United States, it is 
therefore processes of racialization and ethnicization of colonial subjects, rather than 
the mainstream model of the successful assimilation of migrants, that accounts for the 
majority of migrants’ experiences today.
5. Creolizing Europe as Creolizing Theory
The shift of perspective towards a relational concept of space, viewed as capable 
of accounting for transnational inequality structures, has featured prominently among 
the solutions for overcoming methodological nationalism that various authors have 
advanced in recent years. Quite often, the plea for replacing nation-state centered 
“container concepts“ with transnational or cosmopolitan “relational concepts“ of space 
entails the explicit shift in the unit of analysis from individual societies to the world-
economy proposed within the world-systems approach (Weiß 2005, Beck 2007). 
However, the shift from methodological nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism 
is viewed as a necessary adjustment to the qualitative change that twentieth century 
globalization has operated in structures of inequality, but as irrelevant for the assessment 
of earlier or “classical“ inequality contexts – for which the nation-state framework is still 
considered appropriate.
Instead, this paper has used the example of the transnational processes and 
transregional entanglements characterizing Latin America and the Caribbean since 
the sixteenth century in order to reveal the extent to which the mainstream analysis of 
social inequality relies on an overgeneralization of the Western European experience 
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as well as on the erasure of non-Western, non-White experiences from sociological 
theory-building. The twin fallacies of overgeneralization and erasure were made 
possible by two interrelated tendencies of Eurocentric sociological production: First, 
the historical indebtedness of core categories of the sociology of social inequality, 
especially class, to the socioeconomic context of Western European industrial 
society and to the rise of the nation-state, rendered class conflict, proletarianization, 
and social mobility within industrial nations more visible than colonialism, the slave 
trade, and European emigration into the New World. Second, this differential visibility 
made for the disproportionate representation of the former processes in mainstream 
sociological theory as opposed to the latter. Disregarding the massive dislocation of 
people triggered by the European expansion into the Americas since the sixteenth 
century, as well as the consequences which subsequent migration processes have 
had for the ethnic homogenization of core areas on the one hand and for processes 
of racialization and ethnicization in peripheral and semiperipheral ones on the other 
were therefore essential conditions for establishing a sociology of migration devoid of 
colonizers as well as of colonial subjects and a sociology of inequality and stratification 
devoid of race and ethnicity until well into the 20th century (Boatcă 2010).
Instead of heralding transnationalization as a new phenomenon, it would therefore be 
both analytically and politically helpful to adopt creolization as a shift of perspective. 
In order to account for the present of Europe as not racially exclusively White, not 
ethnically or culturally homogeneous, and not socially stratified according to achieved 
characteristics in enclosed national containers, what is needed is an adequate un-
erasure of the history of the non-White, non-European or non-Western regions with 
which Europe was militarily, economically and culturally entangled for centuries – and 
which would not have become hybrid, creole, or transcultural without it – from social 
scientific theory-building. This would not only reveal a far more creolized history of 
Europe than the one we are accustomed to reading, but would also result in creolized 
theory – one that does not overgeneralize from the particular history of its own 
geopolitical location, but that accounts for the continuum of structures of power linking 
geopolitical locations from colonial through postcolonial times.
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